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STATE OF’NEWYORK
SUPFEME COURT

cowry OF ALBANY

In The Matter of CHARLES UTSEY,
Petitioner,

ANDREA EVANS,Chairwoman,
N.Y.S. BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respandent;

For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Cowt Albany County Arti~le78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresiet, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-13-ST4329 IndexNo. 6331-12

Appearances:

I.

Charles Uhey
Inmate No. 11-A-3395
Petitioner, Pro Se
Altma CorrectionaI Faci€ity
555 Devils Den Road
B.O. Box 3000
Altona, NY 12910

Eric T. Schneideman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Laura A. Sprague,
Assistrant Attorney General
of Counsel)

George B , Ceresia, Jr#,Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Altona Correctional Facility, commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated April 17,2012
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to deny him discretionary release on parole, Petitioner is serving a term of 1 113 to 4 years

upon conviction of attempted robbery in the third degree. Among the many arguments set

forth in the petition, the petitioner maintains that the determination was not made in
accordance with the parole review procedures implemented in 20 11, which requires a risk
and needs assessment (see Executive Law 2594 [4j). He argues that the reasons given for
determination were conclwory. He contends that the Paroie Board erred in not providing

guidance or additional reasons for its ruling. He points out that he received an earned
eligibility certificate; and, as indicated during the paroIe interview, he intends to return to his
pre-incarceration ernploynent upon release. He indicates that he has a spotless disciplinary

record. He maintains that the Parole Board’s determination was based upon an improper
standard of review, that his release must be in the best interest of society. In his view, the

Parole Board erred in not questioning him abouthis prior criminal history, thereby precluding
him from explaining his criminal past. In a related argument, he contends that the Parole

Board improperly focused solely on his current offense and criminal past, to the exclusion

of other factors. Petitioner asserts that the 24 month hold was excessive, beyond the release
guideline range, and constitutes a re-sentencing, in violation of law. In his view the

determination was irrational bordering on impropriety. The petitioner indicates that he has
participated hinstitutional programs, including Parenthood and Anger Replacement. He was
working as a gym porter at the time of the parole interview. He has worked in the Facility

storehouse, worked as a recreation yard aid, and he completed his G.E.D. in July 2012.

The reasom for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
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“Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next Appearance 4/20 14.
Despite an earned eligibility certificate, parole is denied. After
a personal interview, record review and deliberation, it is the
determination of this panel that, if released at this time, there is
a reasonable probability that you would not live at liberty
without violating the law. Your release at this time is
incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community.
You appeared before this panel for the serious instant offense of
attempted robbery in the 3d degree. Your criminal record
reflects prior unlawful behavior. This repeated unlawful
behavior is a concern for this panel. Consideration has been
given to an assessment of your risk and needs for success on
parole. The panel also notes your programming, good
disciplinary record, and release plans and your educational
achievements. However, despite these accomplishments, when
considering all relevant factors, discretionary release is not
warranted.”

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory

requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter ofCollado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,

200I]). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitatejudicial intervention @ Matter ofSihon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York Stale Bd. of

Parole, 50 W 2 d 69,77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graz,iano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369

[3d Dept., 201I]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (E

Matter of Perez v. New York

State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).

The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its

decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
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parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such

factors as petitioner's possession of an earned eligibility certificate, his institutional
programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release, including returning to his
previousjob at Crisifulli, where he worked for fifteen years, The Board inquired with regard
to his family. The Board discussed with him a portion of the COMFAS ReEntry N m t i v e

Assessment Summary developed pursuant to the provisions of Executive Law 8 259-c (4).
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of

201 AID2d 825 [3rd Dept.,

Siao-Pao, 11NY3d 773 [2008];

19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept.,
19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of

Matter of Matos v New York State Board

the inmate's crimes and their violent nature

of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 20113; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd
Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The

Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it

considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one &

Matter of MacKenzie v Evm, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 20121; Matter of Matos v New

York State Board of Parole, supra; Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74
AD3d 1681, 1681-1682 [3d Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of
Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept., 20081).Nor must the parole board recite the brecise statutory

language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (seeMatter of
4
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Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 20061). In other words, ‘‘[wlhere appropriate
the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the

circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the

individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her
‘releaseis not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New

York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594
[23 [c] [A], other citations omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a

guaranteeof release (Matter of Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3d
Dept., 20061; 1
25 AD3d 1058 [3d
Dept .,20061).

Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a
resentencing, in violation of the double jeopardy clauses’s prohibition against multiple

punishments are conclusory and without merit (E Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1[3d Dept., 19961;Matter of Crews vNew York State Executive
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3d Dept., 20011; Matter of Evms v

Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter of Ralwasinski v Paterson,

80 AD3d 1065,1066 [3dDept., 20111; Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d
Dept., 201 13; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [3d Dept., 20121). The fact that

an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a
5
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protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1I 14,
1I15 [3d Dept., 200&]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to deterrninewhether

release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum
term of petitioner’s sentence (see

95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000];

Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201I];

Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141,1142 [3d Dept., 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802
[2007J;Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3d Dept., 20071).

As relevant here, the 201 1 amendments to the Executive Law

I,20 I I ch 62, Part

C, Subpart A, 5 33-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations

are made. First, Executive Law
Parole guidelines

9 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of

9 NYCFR 8001.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division ofParoIe to

rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates

have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-fiee if

released (see Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of
parole shall [J (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions its
required by Iaw. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining

which inmates may be released to parole supervision” (Executive Law 259-c [4], enacted in

L 201 I ch 62, Part C,Subpart A, 6 38-b). In the second change, Executive 2594 (2)(c)was

amended to incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to
consider in making release determhations (see L 20 1I ch 62, Part C,Subpart A, 5 28-f-1).
6
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This amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 I, 20 1I (see L
201 1, ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 8 49). However, it did not result in a substantive change in
the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision.
With regard to petitioner’s arguments with respect to alleged the Parole Board’s nom

compliance with Executive Law

6 259-c (4),

as noted, the Parole Board had

before it

petitioner’s COMPAS ReEntry Narrative Assessment Summary dated April 9,20 12, which

contained a comprehensive evaluation of his risk and needs. The Parole Board determination

(sq@

expressly mentions consideration of petitioner’s risk and needs in rendering its

determination. The Court frnds that the argument has no merit.

The Parote Board‘s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)

is Within the Board‘sdiscretion and was supported by the record @Matter of Tatta v State
ofNew York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).

Petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner a d o r

provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he

should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit

Isee
- Executive Law Q 2594 121[a];9 W C R R Q 8002.3;Matter of Francis v New York State
Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 13 12 [3d Dept,, 201I]; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1 [2nd

Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1174 [3rd
Dept., ZOOS]).

With respect to petitioner’s argument that he has served time in excess of the parole
guideline m g e &, 9 NYCRR 800 1,3), the guidelines “are intended only as a guide, and
are

not a substitute for the careful consideration of

7
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individual case” (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division

of Parole, 290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodrimez v Evans, 82 AD3d
1.397 [3d Dept,, 20 111). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn
the Board’s decision,

The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of Zaw, irrational or arbiQaq and capricious. The

petition must therefore be dismissed.

The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,

is sealing all records submitted for in cumera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shaIl constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original

decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this

decisionlorderljudgment and delivery of this decisionlorderljudgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved fiom the applicable

provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
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July
,2013
Troy, New York

Dated:

George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:
1.

2.
3.

4.

Order To Show Cause dated December 2 I, 20 12, Petition, Supporting
Papers and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated February 28,2013,Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Petitioner’s Letter dated March 4,2013
Petitioner’s Letter dated June 6,2013
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